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INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 
 
 
 
This article examines policies of Moscow 
and Brussels in the Baltics since the launch of 
the European Union’s Strategy for the Baltic 
Sea Region in June 2009. 
An increase in the efficiency of Rus-
sia’s policy in the region requires not only 
the development of bilateral relations with 
countries of the region but also a dialogue 
with the European Union, the key player in 
the Baltic. 
The author identifies Russian economic, 
military, political, and humanitarian interests 
in the region, and describes the structure, 
content, and main areas of the implementa-
tion of the EU Baltic strategy in 2009—2013. 
The article examines the evolution of the 
Strategy, which initially ignored Russian na-
tional interests in the region, and yet eventu-
ally resulted in cooperative efforts in the ar-
eas of common interest such as energy, trans-
port infrastructure, environment, research, 
education and culture. The results of the Rus-
sian presidency of the Council of the Baltic 
Sea States (2012—2013) are evaluated. It is 
noted that, despite an appealing presidency 
strategy and certain achievements in its im-
plementation, Russia was unable to draw up 
a regional agenda and use the CBSS as an 
efficient platform for harmonizing its Baltic 
strategy with that of the EU. The causes of 
the current deadlock in EU — Russian rela-
tions regarding the Baltic are analyzed. The 
author formulates policy recommendations 
on fostering Russian-European cooperation 
in the Baltic Sea region. These recommenda-
tions range from the suggestion of joint revi-
sions of mutual conceptual perceptions and 
strategic goals pursued by the EU and Russia 
in the Baltic Sea region to more practical 
measures in the institutional, administrative, 
and financial fields. 
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Introduction 
 
The current relations between Russia and the European Union in the Bal-
tic Sea region (BSR) are characterized by their strongly pronounced asym-
metry. After Poland's accession to the EU in 2004, Russia became the only 
country in the region that did not belong to the EU. Until recently, Brussels 
tended to formulate its strategy on the BSR in a way as if the Baltic Sea were 
“a closed sea” inside the European Union and used all its impressive eco-
nomic potential and “soft power” resources (moral, political and cultural)1 to 
support this position. Russia's interest in the region was barely considered 
or — sometimes — even ignored. There were only nominal requirements to 
engage in cooperation with Russia in official EU documents; in practice, 
there was no interaction on the BSR issue between Moscow and Brussels. At 
the same time, paradoxically, bilateral relations between Russia and the 
countries located in the region developed rapidly as also did relations at the 
level of sub-national and non-state actors. 
In this connection, it is relevant: 
— firstly, to briefly characterize Russia's national interests in the BSR; 
— secondly, to review the content, main directions and evolution of the 
EU strategy in the BSR in recent years; 
— thirdly, to analyze Russia’s attitude towards the EU policy in the BSR 
as well as Moscow’s attempts to create its own regional agenda; 
— fourthly, to evaluate the potential for real (not nominal) cooperation 
in the BSR and to offer specific suggestions for establishing a genuine part-
nership between Brussels and Moscow. 
 
Russia’s national interests in the BSR 
 
To characterize Russia’s national interests in the BSR, it is necessary to 
recollect the radical changes that took place after the end of the Cold War. 
Since then, the focus of Russia’s policy in the Baltics has changed from the 
matters of "strong" (military) national security to the problems of "soft" 
(non-military) security and "traditional" (not related to security) cooperation 
in such fields as economic development, the environment, tourism, culture 
and education. After years of being a region of confrontation (and, automati-
cally, a zone of inter-civilization "fracture" in the 1990s), the BSR has not 
yet become a model cooperation zone (as it was hoped by the Russian and 
Western worlds in the period of their "romance"). However, it has definitely 
turned into an area of numerous contacts established both at governmental 
and non-governmental levels. The BSR is even referred to as "a testing 
ground" and "a laboratory for European integration" by some Russian and for-
eign researchers. This emphasizes a unique and, at the same time, innovative 
nature of the modern Baltic Sea region [10; 11; 13]. 
                                                     
1 To study Germany’s soft power strategy as an example, see [1; 2]. 
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The BSR hardly belongs to Moscow’s top geopolitical priorities, and 
some other regions, due to various reasons, attract more attention of Russian 
diplomats. However, there are several factors which are systematically in-
creasing the significance of the BSR in terms of Russia's national interest. 
First of all, the BSR is the only region — except for Karelia and the 
Murmansk region — with the longest Russian border with the EU. Also, it is 
a territory crossed by very busy routes of passenger, goods and services traf-
fic. Since Peter the Great, the Baltics had been “a window to Europe” for 
Russia for a long time, and even now it still fulfills this role, despite various 
geopolitical cataclysms that have taken place in recent times. 
Secondly, after the construction of the Baltic Pipeline System and the 
Nord Stream pipeline, the BSR became one of the main routes of energy 
supplies from Russia to Europe. This stimulated the growth of the BSR’s 
importance to Moscow and made it the key factor in the evolving dialogue 
between Russia and the EU. As a result, other energy corridors between 
Russia and Europe — neither existent nor expected — will not undermine 
the strategic importance of the BSR in the foreseeable future. 
Thirdly, "the Kaliningrad problem" continues to receive close attention 
from Moscow. At that, it should be noted that an exclave status of the Kalin-
ingrad region involves both problems (the main one being related to guaran-
tying the EU four freedoms, namely free movement of people, goods, ser-
vices and capital) and great opportunities offered by the "involvement" of 
the westernmost Russian region in the process of European integration. Both 
sides, Europe and Russia, consider the Kaliningrad region as "a pilot region" 
— though they differ in their understanding of this concept — and rather 
boldly experiment with implementing economic, trade and visa policies in 
this region. 
Fourthly, the issues related to human rights of the Russian speaking 
communities in the Baltic states of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania are still on 
the agenda. Although their critical importance for Moscow has diminished 
recently, this problem occurs time after time leading to certain adjustments 
to the regional policy. Besides, several years ago, Moscow launched a new 
state policy towards compatriots living abroad and established new institu-
tions (Russkiy Mir Foundation, the Federal Agency for the Commonwealth 
of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad and International Hu-
manitarian Cooperation commonly known as Rossotrudnichestvo, etc.). Rus-
sia’s implementation of its soft power strategy provokes rather mixed re-
sponses from the officials of the three Baltic countries and the EU. In this 
respect, the BSR proves to be a territory of rivalry between Russia and the 
EU in terms of their soft power strategies. 
Fifthly, the Baltics still experiences phantom pains of the past era. Al-
though mutual prejudices and fears originated in the Cold War have been 
"amputated", these phantom pains are sometimes felt. For instance, the three 
Baltic countries and Poland periodically try to persuade NATO and the USA 
that there is a threat coming from the East, which necessitates new pro-
grammes for modernizing the armed forces or deploying NATO military in-
frastructure in the BSR. In return, Russia threatens to re-militarize the Kalin-
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ingrad region or even its entire northwestern part and station Iskander mis-
sile systems in Kaliningrad. Along with these threats, Moscow modernizes 
the Baltic Sea Fleet and air defense systems and holds military exercises in 
the region. This situation serves clear evidence of the old agenda related to 
geostrategic East-West confrontation in the BSR. 
In spite of their heterogeneous and even contradictory nature, the above-
mentioned factors stimulate Russia’s interest in the BSR. 
 
EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR): 
evolution of methods 
 
The EUSBSR was adopted on 10 June 2009. It was aimed at formulating 
a common EU policy on the BSR after the accession of Poland, Latvia, Es-
tonia and Lithuania to the EU. Along with the Northern Dimension (2000), 
the EU Arctic Policy (2008), the Black Sea Synergy (2007) and the Eastern 
Partnership (2009) projects, the EUSBSR was meant to become another re-
gional dimension of the EU foreign policy in the East. The geographical 
scope of the strategy covered eight EU members that had an outlet to the 
Baltic Sea as well as Russia, Belarus and Norway — for the purpose of im-
plementing region-wide environmental, energy and transport projects. 
The strategy identifies four main pillars/key challenges: 
1) to make the BSR an environmentally sustainable place: it focuses at-
tention on the state of the marine environment; 
2) to make the BSR a prosperous place: it is aimed at removing trade 
barriers in the EU internal market in the BSR, developing research and inno-
vation, supporting small and medium businesses and reinforcing sustainabil-
ity of the basic industries — agriculture, forestry and fisheries; 
3) to make the BSR an accessible and attractive place: it is aimed at im-
proving the access to the BSR by modernization of its transportation system 
and reinforcing the attractiveness of the region by means of enhancing edu-
cation, tourism, health, culture and energy efficiency; 
4) to make the BSR a safe and secure place: it calls to improve maritime 
safety and security, to reinforce protection from major emergencies at sea 
and on land, and to decrease the volume of cross-border crime [8]. 
The strategy is accompanied by the Action Plan, which is meant to be 
annually updated, and the Commission staff working document describing 
the prerequisites for the creation of the EUSBSR. In the Action Plan, the 
above-mentioned four thematic priorities are divided in 15 priority areas to 
be covered by individual projects. The most important of them are called 
Flagship Projects [6]. 
Originally, the strategy concept as well as all supporting documents em-
phasized that the EUSBSR was created only for the EU members and Brussels 
did not plan Russia’s involvement in the projects. However, it proved to be 
difficult for the EU to manage without Russia due to the necessity to cooperate 
with the neighbouring countries when implementing the four EUSBSR priori-
ties. Russia was the most important country among them. Therefore, Russia’s 
participation in the EUSBSR Flagship Projects was introduced in the Action 
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Plan. For example, Flagship Project 5.2 was aimed at implementing the joint 
EU—Russia energy efficiency initiative. Despite a heated debate about the 
Nord Stream project in the early 2000s, the European Commission included it 
in the Trans-European Energy Networks (TEN-E) programme. Apparently, 
some EU members interested in the construction of the pipeline (e. g. France, 
Germany and the Netherlands) insisted on it. 
Furthermore, Flagship Projects 6.5 and 6.6 were focused on harmonizing 
trade and custom policies of the EU and Russia. They focused on improving 
the border infrastructure, and were set to simplify customs procedures and to 
ease congestion at border crossings [6, p. 31—32]. 
Also, the EU and Russia planned a rather impressive programme in the 
field of transport. Thus, Flagship Project 11.4 was meant to support a Polish-
Lithuanian initiative for the establishment of "Functional Airspace Blocks" 
for the purpose of airspace management. This initiative involved the Kalin-
ingrad region, too [7, p. 71—72]. Another Flagship Project — "Cooperate 
for Smarter Transport" — was devoted to the development of safety multi-
modal transport corridors in the BSR, specifically the Green Corridor from 
ports of Sweden, Denmark and Germany to ports of Lithuania and Kalinin-
grad [6, p. 55]. As part of Priority area 13, the EU and Russia planned to de-
velop a system aimed at ensuring sea transport safety. That was extremely 
important due to intensified transportation of crude oil, mineral oil, petro-
leum products and liquefied petroleum gas across the Baltic Sea. Although 
Russia was given a rather small role in environmental cooperation in the 
EUSBSR (there was only one Flagship Project (1.5) focused on assessment 
of pollution-related risks), Moscow and Brussels developed fruitful relations 
in the framework of other programmes and initiatives: the Northern Dimen-
sion Environmental Partnership, the Baltic Sea Action Plan (the Helsinki 
Commission), etc. 
Flagship Projects 12.7—12.10 (part of Priority area 12) were devoted to 
the development of strategies for sustainable tourism in the region by har-
monizing tourism standards and creating a common marketing strategy 
aimed at ensuring joint efforts in the BSR’s promotion in the global tourism 
market [6, p. 59—60]. 
The Youth Resource Centre was established in Lithuania within Flagship 
Project 12.6 in order to encourage cooperation among youth organizations in 
the Baltic Sea region and, additionally, with those coming from Belarus, 
Ukraine, Moldova and the Caucasus [6, p. 59]. 
Unfortunately, not all projects which were supposed to involve Russian 
partners were implemented or completed. 
In 2011, the European Commission began to review the EUSBSR. It was 
necessary due to both rather dynamic processes in the region and criticism of 
the strategy from Russia and even the EU members. In June 2011, the Baltic 
Sea States Subregional Cooperation (a political organization for the EU 
members of the BSR authorities) published an evaluation report. It stated di-
rectly that Russia's absence in the BSR was a severe drawback of the strat-
egy [9, p. 9]. The joint position adopted in April 2012 by the BSR subre-
gional, municipal and non-governmental organizations (the Baltic Sea States 
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Subregional Cooperation (BSSSC), the Union of the Baltic Cities (UBS), the 
Baltic Development Forum, the Euroregion Baltic) acknowledged an urgent 
need for including Russia and Norway in the BSR [12]. 
However, the EU documents released in 2012 (mainly the Communica-
tion from the European Commission of 23 March 2012 and Conclusions of 
the European Council of 26 June 2012) demonstrated that the expressed 
criticism had been ignored by Brussels. The documents contained essential 
adjustments related to the EU members. However, they did not include any 
serious changes concerning Russia. Moscow was offered cooperation in the 
framework of the existing projects — the Northern Dimension, the Council 
of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), the Union of the Baltic Cities, the Baltic 
Sea States Subregional Cooperation, the Nordic Council of Ministers, etc. [3, 
p. 6; 8; 4, p. 4]. Apart from that, the documents stressed the importance of 
cooperation with Russia in maritime surveillance as well as prevention, pre-
paredness and response to disasters at sea and on land. 
 
Russia’s Policy in the Baltics 
 
The unconstructive position of the European Union did not promote the 
idea of cooperation so Moscow was forced to look for other opportunities to 
pursue Russia’s national interests. No reaction on the EUSBSR followed 
from the Kremlin (as opposed to the Northern Dimension project). It clearly 
demonstrated that Moscow had no intentions to "force" the EU to develop 
friendship. Instead, Russia continued to maintain bilateral contacts with the 
BSR countries within multilateral diplomacy (for example, there has been a 
real breakthrough in Russia's relationship with Poland and Lithuania in re-
cent years) and concentrated on cooperation with the regional and subre-
gional institutions. 
Thus, a lot of attention was directed to the Council of the Baltic Sea 
States. It is the most effective tool of multilateral diplomacy for Russia as it 
enjoys equal rights with other countries. The EU enlargement in 2004 put the 
CBSS in a rather difficult position. After their accession to the EU, Poland 
and the three Baltic states seemed to have lost any motivation to cooperate 
inside the CBSS. The adoption of the EUSBSR in 2009 presented another 
blow for this organization: the strategy had been designed only for "a private 
club". Being outsiders, Russia, Norway and Iceland had to work really hard 
in order to transform the CBSS through the adoption of new conceptual 
documents. These documents clarified the mission and functional objectives 
of the Council, and reorganized its structure and budget. 
It should be noted that Germany (it was one of the initiators of the estab-
lishment of the Council in 1992) had a significant role to play in transforming 
the CBSS. Germany was interested in implementing "a new Hansa project" 
and maintaining a cooperation channel with Russia. During the German Presi-
dency of the CBSS (2011—2012), the Initiative of Modernization of the South 
Eastern Baltic Area through regional cooperation (SEBA) was launched. In 
fact, this programme became a small replica of the EU-Russia Partnership for 
Modernization and was specifically adapted to the needs of the BSR. Russia 
supported the Initiative and contributed to its implementation. 
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The Russian Presidency of the CBSS (1 July 2012—30 June 2013) can 
be considered a culminating point of Russia's attempt to transform the 
CBSS. Russia proposed four main priorities: 
— cooperation in the field of modernization and innovation with the fo-
cus on clusters of growth in the region; 
— establishment of a network of public-private partnership as a platform 
for sustainable socioeconomic development; 
— promotion of the traditions of tolerance as a means of combating ten-
dencies of radicalism and extremism; 
— promotion of people-to-people contacts and facilitation of the existing 
visa regime [14]. 
Although the programme did not articulate the idea of developing coop-
eration with the EUSBSR directly, all these priorities almost perfectly fitted 
in the EUSBSR thematic platforms and could be easily integrated with the 
corresponding projects. Unfortunately, the EU did not demonstrate much in-
terest in Russia’s initiatives. Moscow found individual partners among the 
BSR countries, which were both the EU and the CBSS members. This de-
cided the fate of Russian Presidency of the CBSS. 
On the one hand, Moscow managed to implement several specific pro-
posals. For example, as part of the public-private partnership development, 
Vnesheconombank and German State Bank KfW signed a credit agreement 
on extending 110 million US dollars to Vnesheconombank. Besides, there 
were projects on creating a tourism cluster around Lake Vistynets (Vistytis). 
It is located on the border between Lithuania and the Kaliningrad region and 
is often called the European Baikal. Also, the project of a summer youth 
camp in the Kaliningrad region, "Baltic Artek", was launched in 2010. Fi-
nally, the EuroFaculty Pskov project at Pskov State University entered its 
second three-year phase (2012—2015) drawing on the experience of Im-
manuel Kant Baltic Federal University. 
On the other hand, there were many failures in the implementation of the 
programme of the Russian Presidency of the CBSS. A number of reasons 
made it impossible to obtain funding for the planned projects. As a result, the 
implementation of the SEBA programme — the object of both Russian and 
German hopes — slowed down. Moreover, the partners turned out to have 
different ideas about the purpose of the modernization programmes. Russia 
had a rather rational attitude and was interested in European technology and 
investment in the economy of its northwestern regions; the Western side in-
sisted on radical reforms of legal regulations and state institutions responsi-
ble for creating favorable investment conditions and taking anti-corruption 
measures. 
Russia's initiatives to promote tolerance, anti-radicalism and anti-ex-
tremism in the BSR were practically ignored. The three Baltic States re-
garded them as Moscow's attempt to interfere in their internal affairs through 
Russian-speaking communities. Russia's call for visa facilitation in the BSR 
was considered as inappropriate as all visa policies were supposed to be dis-
cussed within the Schengen zone. It is obvious that Russia’s visa initiative 
had been inspired by the success of the Norway-Russia (2010) and Russia-
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Poland (2011) arrangements for simplified border-crossing regimes for bor-
der residents. However, the BSR cannot make any border-crossing agree-
ments without the EU approval. Thus, the results of the Russian Presidency 
of the CBSS are rather modest, and the most important problem of uniting 
two different strategies with the help of the CBSS still remains unresolved. 
 
Some thoughts on further EU-Russian dialogue in the Baltics 
 
It must be admitted that at the moment the EU-Russia relations are in 
deadlock. However, Moscow and the EU members are engaged in a dia-
logue, both at bilateral and multilateral levels. So what can be done to make 
this dialogue more constructive? 
First and foremost, expectations for future cooperation between Moscow 
and Brussels in the BSR should be realistic. So it is necessary to remember 
that the success of regional partnership depends on the general state of EU-
Russia relations. Currently, they are rather strained, and a possible break-
through is hardly expected to happen in the Baltics. At the same time, com-
pared to other regions involved in the Eastern Partnership programme, the 
BSR is in more favorable conditions than "the new EU neighbourhood". 
There are no local frozen conflicts comparable to the ones in Transnistria, 
Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The level of trade, eco-
nomic, cultural and educational cooperation between Russia and the BSR 
countries is higher than the cooperation between Moscow and the countries 
in the Caucasus or Moldova. These factors inspire some optimism for the 
prospects of the EU-Russian dialogue in the BSR. 
Both the European Union and Russia have to begin serious work to make 
changes in their perception of each other's ideologies. Thus, it is time for 
Brussels to stop inconsistency in its evaluation of Russia. Russia is some-
times viewed as a potentially promising "student" who studies market econ-
omy and democracy (it was a characteristic feature of the EU in the 1990s 
and in the early 2000s); or it is considered to be a bad "student" who "does 
not do his homework" and bullies more diligent "students" (i. e. post-Soviet 
countries) or even tries to form a "gang" (i. e. the Customs Union, the Eura-
sian Union, etc.). At the same time, Moscow has to get rid of various stereo-
types and stop viewing the EU as a "bureaucratic monster" who tries to un-
dermine Russia's position in the BSR and reduce it to a "raw materials ap-
pendage". 
In alliance with other countries in the region, Russia should insist on 
greater openness of the EUSBSR to turn it from "a private club" into a plat-
form for regional cooperation. It would be helpful to use the experience of 
the Northern Dimension, which started as one of the regional programmes of 
the EU and eventually turned into a true partnership between the EU, Russia, 
Norway and Iceland. The process of rapprochement between Russia and the 
EU should ensure the development of areas of mutual interest like energy, 
transport infrastructure, environment, humanitarian issues, etc. 
Along with other members of the Baltic political process, Russia and the 
EU could contribute to a better "division of labor" between regional and 
 International cooperation 
 46 
subregional organizations and forums (the Northern Dimension, the CBSS, 
the Nordic Council of Ministers, the Baltic Sea States Subregional Coopera-
tion, the Union of the Baltic Cities, the Helsinki Commission, etc.). At the 
moment, their activities overlap in many respects, which leads to the dissipa-
tion of forces and resources (which are, in fact, rather limited). To remedy 
the situation, these multilateral institutions should clarify and negotiate their 
purposes and duties. Some organisations (for example, the CBSS) have to 
complete their institutional reforms in order to ensure more effective work in 
our constantly changing environment. 
To strengthen a cooperation platform between Russia and the EU, it is 
necessary to develop contacts at the highest levels, as well as to actively in-
volve sub-national and non-state actors: regions, municipalities, business 
communities, mass media, educational, cultural and civil society institutions, 
etc. Excessive bureaucracy and inefficiency of some of the existing coopera-
tion channels lead to failures or even closures of potentially promising initia-
tives (for example, Twin Cities or Euroregion Motion). Russia and the EU 
could breathe new life into similar old initiatives and launch new ones with 
the help of the existing institutions like the BSSSC, the UBC, the City Twins 
Association, etc. 
The financial aspects of cooperation in the BSR should receive special 
attention of Russia and the EU. The European Parliament approved the EU 
budget for 2014—2020 so it is high time the interested European countries 
and organisations reserved funds for regional cooperation programmes be-
cause the chronic Eurozone crisis is likely to result in a struggle for the fair 
share of the "budget pie". Meanwhile, Russia has to estimate resources 
which can be contributed to common projects in the BSR. Rich "Uncle 
Europe" is going to stop financing projects in an indiscriminate way. Russia 
will have to choose from a variety of projects those ones which have poten-
tial for ensuring sustainable development. 
In conclusion, it needs to be mentioned that the possibilities and pros-
pects of cooperation between Russia and the EU should be the subject of 
constant attention and discussion of expert and academic communities in 
Russia and the EU. Research projects concentrated on searching for the ways 
and means for developing cooperation between Russia and the EU in the 
Baltics could break the ice in the Russia-EU relations and prove to be sig-
nificant investment in the future. 
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